Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Many professional services are so-called experience goods where the quality of the service cannot easily be observed by the consumer before after the service is consumed. And even then it can take considerable time before substandard quality is revealed. Medical and dental services, architectural and engineering services and accounting are cases in point. For instance, health problems due to negligence or malpractice in health and dental services may occur long after the service has been consumed, weaknesses in buildings and other construction work due to flaws in design can become apparent long after the building has been built and so on. Due to these market imperfections stemming from asymmetric information, the services sectors are subject to a number of regulatory measures. This study aims at documenting how such regulation -often unintentionally -restricts international trade in services and how legitimate regulations can be made less trade restrictive.
Compliance with regulatory measures typically involves an up-front cost prior to entering a foreign market, but it does not necessarily affect the cost of servicing the market once entry is made.
Compliance with qualification requirements, for instance, could imply taking an exam that documents that the services supplier has the required qualification. Course work may also be required prior to the exam.
Licence requirements are of a similar nature. A license needs to be acquired and a license fee paid before trade can commence, but the license fee is often unrelated to subsequent export values.
The impact on trade of regulatory measures that constitute a barrier to entry calls for a different approach to trade policy analysis than the traditional study of tariffs and tariff equivalent trade costs.
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While tariffs increase the market price of imports and/or lower the unit price that the exporter receives, a fixed trade cost need not affect the price of the good or the service much. But a fixed cost has an impact on the export value necessary for the exporting firm to break even. The higher the volume, the lower is the cost per unit. Therefore, fixed trade costs affect the average size of exporting firms and by implication the number of firms that the market can accommodate. The higher the entry barrier, the larger the export 1 A common way of modelling trade costs is the so-called iceberg costs where a certain percentage of the value of the traded good "melts away" during transit (Samuelson, 1952) . volume needs to be. This means, perhaps paradoxically, that the higher the entry barriers to foreign services suppliers, the larger the market share the foreign suppliers need to capture, assuming that the entry barrier is not prohibitive.
Fixed trade costs or entry barriers have attracted little attention in the literature until recently.
This study suggests a methodology for analysing fixed costs in services trade and provides a first attempt to estimate the impact of such costs for the OECD area. Only one study has been published so far on this topic and it studies intra-EU services trade only (Kox and Lejour, 2005) . The current study therefore contributes to new insight into an area that is under-researched but highly relevant as domestic regulation is on the negotiation table in the now suspended Doha round in the WTO. The study could also provide useful insights during the implementation of the Services Directive in the European Union and inform the debate related to regulatory issues in regional trade agreements.
In the following we will define "trade liberalisation" as trade policies that reduce variable trade costs or remove trade barriers that have a similar effect as quotas in merchandise trade. A quota can in principle be zero; i.e. imports can be banned, and can be converted to tariff-equivalent trade costs.
2 "Regulatory reforms" are defined as policies that reduce the fixed cost of entering a foreign market. These can be related to qualification requirements, licences or standards. They may well be the same for local and foreign services providers, but could still be more burdensome for foreign providers. It would for instance be more burdensome for foreign services providers if a qualification requirement was in the form of a diploma or certificate from a local education institution rather than specifying the skills required. A regulatory principle from technical standards for goods is that standards should be functional rather than specific, a principle that could be applied to services as well. Quotas can easily be converted to tariff equivalents in the event of competitive markets, but this is not the case when suppliers have significant market power. 3 It is for instance better to specify standards e.g. for valves used in the petroleum industry in terms of ability to function under prescribed temperature and pressure conditions rather than specifying dimensions and alloys.
The study is organised as follows: Section 2 explains the concept of fixed trade costs and how it affects trade flows and market structure. Section 3 presents the regulatory indices used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents empirical results where the indicators presented in Section 3 are used to estimate the relation between domestic regulation on the one hand and international trade flows as well as market entry on the other hand. Section 5 summarises and discusses policy implications.
REGULATORY BARRIERS TO TRADE IN SERVICES: CONCEPTS AND EVIDENCE
The fact that a national service market is regulated is not in itself an important barrier to international services trade. Suppose that all countries have the same type of regulation, for instance, a qualification requirement for providers producing a particular service product. Since qualification costs are mainly fixed costs, it would cost an exporting firm a one-off effort to comply with the qualification criteria.
Once having incurred these costs in its home country, the firm could reap economies of scale by expanding into export markets.
However, such a harmonised system of regulation for service markets hardly exists. Countries often have little confidence in the quality of each other's legal regimes and are reluctant to adapt their own regimes where necessary to facilitate cross-border activities. The result is that each national authority uses its own system of quality safeguards to protect services buyers. Due to the fact that these fixed qualification requirements are specific for each national market, the costs cannot be spread out over production that is destined for other OECD markets. This makes it difficult to exploit economies of scale.
It has been well documented that only a fraction of existing firms in a particular industry exports, those that do tend to be more productive and larger than the industry average, while each exporting firm typically exports to a limited number of countries Jensen, 1997, 1999; Bernard et al. 2003) . If there were no extra costs of entering foreign markets, there is no reason why firms should not sell their output in all markets where customers could be found, and the observed trade patterns consequently strongly suggests the existence of entry barriers and fixed trade costs.
In a survey held among a large number of business service firms in the EU, 44% of the firms mentioned costs as a "very important" barrier to setting up a local operation in other countries (CSES, 2001 ). Those firms that were able to estimate the size of the setup costs estimated the latter to be of the order of 6 months sales proceeds. As a conclusion of an EU-wide survey on intra-EU trade barriers the European Commission (2002) Regulation heterogeneity suppresses foreign competition and the influx of foreign services providers with new products and innovative working methods. It implicitly restricts the choice possibilities for domestic firms that want to purchase business services.
Even though firm heterogeneity is a feature of the business environment that most observers are aware of, trade policy analysis has until recently abstracted from this fact. It is thought that simplifying the analysis by using the notion of a representative firm has facilitated tractable analyses that by and large produce reasonable results and insights. However, as variable trade costs have declined due to trade liberalisation and improved transport and communication technology, fixed trade costs and their impact on trade flows and market structure have caught more attention. An early contribution to the literature was Venables (1994) who showed that trade liberalisation in the presence of fixed trade costs would lead to market concentration in the liberalising sector. New firms would enter the export market, existing exporters would increase their export volumes while some firms would close down and the average firm size would increase as a result. Nevertheless, even if the global number of firms in the liberalising industry declines, the number of firms servicing a particular country (local + foreign firms) need not decline.
Moreover, in small countries competition is usually enhanced because the number of foreign entrants exceeds the number of local firms that exits the market. Subsequent research has shown that unless the fixed costs are very large relative to the market size, small countries will experience the largest increase in the number of suppliers (Nordås, 2003) .
The latest contributions to the literature have aimed at describing and explaining the dynamic interaction between fixed, sunk and variable trade costs and market structure, following a seminal paper by Melitz (2003) , who introduced heterogeneous firms and fixed and variable costs in trade models. An important insight from this work is that firms will self-select into export markets and the most productive firms within the sector will become exporters. As variable trade costs come down, existing exporters will expand their export sales, the most productive among the firms servicing the local market only will become exporters and expand their total output, while the least productive firms servicing the domestic economy only will close down. This reallocation of resources between firms within the liberalising sector will increase the average productivity in the sector. It will also lower the average productivity of exporting firms, since firms that are lower on the productivity ranking in their home country are able to enter foreign markets.
The models based on firm heterogeneity can also be used for analysing the impact of regulatory reform on trade. Lowering entry costs, for instance through harmonisation of technical standards, would encourage new firms to enter export markets. The theory predicts that this would be the only channel through which reforms would affect trade since existing exporters have presumably already recovered their entry costs. Regulatory reform could therefore moderate the market concentration effect of trade liberalisation. Negotiations under the GATS on specific commitments and on disciplines on domestic regulation complement each other and could result in more trade without an undesirable market concentration effect.
The only existing empirical analysis that studies the impact of domestic regulation on services trade treating regulatory barriers as fixed costs (to our knowledge) is a study by Kox and Lejour (2004; which analyses intra-EU trade in commercial services. As a proxy for regulation-based fixed market entry costs, the study develops an index of bilateral regulatory heterogeneity. Regulatory differences are seen as an entry barrier for the reasons explained in the thought experiment above. The indices for regulatory heterogeneity are found to have a strong negative and significant impact on bilateral trade flows.
The study also controls for the relative intensity of regulation in origin and destination country. It finds that the impact of the regulatory level is asymmetric. A high level of regulation in the exporting country has a negative impact on bilateral services trade, while the regulation level in the importing country has no significant impact on bilateral services trade. The study applies these results for assessing the potential trade impacts of the proposed EU Services Directive.
The treatment of all trade barriers as tariff equivalents is also the weakness of a number of empirical studies analysing the impact of Doha round liberalisation using general equilibrium modelling.
These studies abstract from fixed services trade costs and also the fact that regulatory heterogeneity has a trade restricting effect (e.g. Dee and Hanslow, 2000; Dee, 2005) . General equilibrium analyses typically estimate the tariff equivalent of trade barriers in services, calibrate the benchmark solution with these tariffs and then model trade liberalisation as the elimination of the tariffs -creating a single world market price for the liberalised service. As argued above, this is unrealistic in the presence of natural barriers to trade in services.
Among the indicators used in quantitative estimates of services trade liberalisation are a set of indicators developed by the OECD for OECD countries (Boylaud et al., 2000; Jean and Nicoletti, 2002; Golub, 2003) Unfortunately, although the indicators are intended to measure similar effects, they are not always consistent with each other. For instance Golub (2003) found that the correlation between his own indicators on regulation affecting foreign direct investment and corresponding indicators from the APC ranked between 0.1 for business services to 0.58 for telecommunications services.
5 Thus, measuring trade restrictiveness in services is fraught with difficulties and leaves considerable space for subjective judgement and interpretation. Results should therefore be seen as indicating the direction and order of magnitudes of relations between regulation and trade flows rather than precise estimates of causal relations.
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The financial sector regulatory measures are compiled and published by Barth et al. (2006) .
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A correlation coefficient close to one would indicate that the measures are consistent with each other and measure the same thing. Differences in scores are due to differences in methodology and do not imply that one is superior to the other. It simply means that there is no exact measure of regulatory restrictions that are applicable to all countries and all sectors.
The present study builds on the Kox and Lejour framework and extends it in three dimensions. Most countries and regions in the world are included as partners, but of these only 68 had comprehensive coverage by sector and reporting country. This was not a relevant issue studying intra-EU trade only, since there are very few empty cells in the intra-EU trade matrix.
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Exports to some of the countries are reported by only one OECD member. For instance Canada is the only country reporting services exports to a number of small Latin American countries while Australia is the only country reporting exports to small Pacific countries such as Fiji. This probably further illustrates the relevance of distance in services trade, but since the other reporters have no information on trade with these countries, no firm conclusions can be drawn. 
Exports Imports
Source: OECD (2006) The OECD as a whole runs a small trade surplus in services with total exports amounting to Only 20 out of 30 OECD countries report exports of other business services by destination. And even for these countries there are a number of gaps in the data. About half of total exports from the EU 15 went to other EU countries in other business services and about 55% in financial services.
Product-market regulation of countries may differ in many dimensions such as the sectoral coverage, the regulatory instruments, the responsible agencies, the legal status, the area of regulation, exemptions, transparency, and treatment of foreign companies. As a consequence, cost impacts for individual companies may be quite different. In empirical trade models all these aspects must be simplified and quantified in meaningful quantitative indicators. The present paper distinguishes and compares two approaches in this regard. The first approach quantifies a country's relative regulation intensity compared to other countries, and another approach stresses the (bilateral) degree of heterogeneity in product-market regulation.
The OECD Economics Department developed a detailed database with indicators of productmarket regulations for member states. The database is mainly formed by official government responses to the OECD Regulatory Indicators Questionnaire. The first version of the database referred to the reference year 1998 and consisted of some 1600 items of product-market regulation for each country. A later version for 2003 reduced the number of items to some 805 (Conway et al., 2005) . The OECD International
Regulation database also contains some detailed information on regulation items in a few specific service sectors (retail trade, telecommunication, transport, energy distribution, professional services), but on the whole the information concerning the product regulation in the OECD member states is of a more general nature.
The basic data are used to calculate composite indicators or 'summary indicators'. A few steps are taken for doing this. The country answer for each item is coded and ordered in a scale ranging from 0 to 6. 9 The next step is to aggregate the items to summary indicators. The summary indicators are obtained by means of factor analysis, in which each component of the regulatory framework is weighted according to its contribution to the overall variance in the data. The methodology is described in Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (2000) . In this way summary indicators for the relative strictness of regulations by country, by policy area, and to some extent also by economic sector are constructed. Five sub-domains of product- The indicator ranges from 0 for the least restrictive to 6 for the most restrictive regulation level, based on a pre-defined ranking. The restrictiveness ranking adds a subjective element to the indicator.
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The aggregate product market regulation index used in the regressions contains information from all sections in Table 1 items in product-market regulation. But it would be a fallacy to assume that an average score of 2.5 means that both countries have identical regulations in place. Indeed, the underlying regulatory measures in the two countries may well be completely dissimilar. In the OECD International Regulation database and elsewhere it is well-documented that countries may have very different types of regulation for one sector, even within one trade block like the EU. 11 The degree of regulation heterogeneity can be assumed to correlate positively with fixed compliance and information costs for the exporting services firm. The country specificity of the regulations limits the firm's potential scale effects that could otherwise be attained in complying with national regulations. Kox and Lejour (2004; develop a new index for bilateral policy heterogeneity. 12 Their indicator is based on detailed comparisons between individual country pairs for specific aspects of product market regulation, both regarding the form and the contents of the regulation. This yields binary information per policy item: if two countries have a different policy in place the assigned dissimilarity value is one, and zero otherwise. The procedure is repeated for some 130 different policy items. The scores per country pair are averaged to yield an average policy heterogeneity indicator for each country pair. The procedure is described in more technical detail in Kox and Nordås (2007) . The value of the average several sections in Table 1 . There is in other words no one-to-one relationship between the data points summarised in Table 1 and the sub-domains of product market regulation.
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A more detailed picture of the heterogeneity of regulation policies between countries for business services is given in OECD (1996) and CSES (2001) .
indicator ranges between 1 in case of complete dissimilarity and 0 in case of identical product-market regulations. The results can also be decomposed for the domains of product-market regulation, following the same classification as used by the OECD Economics Department. The results for the overall heterogeneity index for the five sub-domains of product-market regulation identified in the OECD regulation database are shown in Table 1 .
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They build on earlier work by the OECD Economics Department, in particular the results of the OECD Regulatory Indicators Questionnaire. PMR intensity levels vary between 0.9 for the U.K. and 2.8 for Poland, whereas unweighted PMR heterogeneity levels vary between 0.31 (Luxembourg) and 0.41 (Australia). The range of variation for trade-weighted heterogeneity indicators is about the same, but at the country level the performance is different.
A question can be whether both types of indicators for national policy differences really yield different information. If the information in one of both indicators would already be implied by the other indicator, then the other indicator is more or less redundant and can be skipped. Intuitively, one would expect that the relative intensity level is more general than the heterogeneity indicator, for the simple reason that having more rules easily leads to also having different rules. A simple regression actually fails to establish a significant relationship between the regulatory intensity and heterogeneity indicators. This confirms that both really measure different aspects of national policy differences. The reason is probably found in historical patterns of regulation. Product-market regulation in services often has a long history.
Each authority has over time developed its own system of quality safeguards for domestic buyers, with its own rules and agencies. Many service industries were until quite recently hardly exposed to foreign competition, so there was not much reason for policy convergence. Globalisation, economic integration and the active search for best practices in regulation have brought about a move towards reduced policy heterogeneity in last decades. 13 Estimates of the gains from further harmonisation (or mutual recognition)
are provided in the next section.
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES FOR TOTAL SERVICES TRADE AND OTHER

BUSINESS SERVICES
This section applies the gravity model for estimating the impact of regulatory measures on trade flows and on market entry. The gravity model explains bilateral trade as a function of the trading partners' market size, and bilateral trade costs relative to all other trading partners. Trade costs in turn include transport, tariffs and a host of administrative costs related to crossing the border, translating information to a foreign language and cultural context and entering and enforcing contracts with foreign suppliers. Commonly used measures of such costs are the distance between the trading partners, whether or not they have a common border, whether or not they share a common language and whether or not one or both are members of a regional trade agreement. See technical annex for model specification and methodology.
forward way (using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions on its log transformation), but recent research has shown that this produces biased results. In particular, omitting zero flows may result in a selection bias, trade costs need to reflect the fact that relative rather than absolute trade costs matter for bilateral trade flows and OLS estimates are not efficient. 15 The methodology applied here seeks to avoid these problems.
First, the probability to enter export markets is estimated based on the following function:
(1)
Our concern with fixed costs makes the determinants of entry interesting in its own right. The equation represents the probability to export services as a function of the usual gravity variables -the trading partners' market size as represented by their GDP, the distance between them adjusted for weighted average distance to all other trading partners (weighted by GDP) and a number of dummy variables representing geography, history and trade policies. 16 The dummy variables included are the following:
whether or not trading partners have a common border, whether or not they share a common language, whether or not one or both are members of the European Union or NAFTA. In addition we have constructed a dummy variable that reflects similarity in the quality of government regulation. It takes the value of one if the country pair's score on the World Banks' governance indices differ by less than one standard deviation and zero otherwise. This measure indicates whether the trading partners have a similar capacity to implement regulation rather than similarities in the specifics of regulation.
A methodology for estimating the gravity model of trade flows that has proved to be unbiased, Here Y represents the GDP of the exporting and importing country, d the distance between them and T is a measure of trade costs including the same components as in equation (3) unless otherwise stated. We focus on two aspects of domestic regulation: the average intensity level of regulation (each country compared to the OECD average), and the bilateral heterogeneity in regulation that may confront the individual firm (comparing two individual countries). Not all countries trade services with each other. We therefore make a distinction between the effect of regulation on the decision to trade or not to trade and on subsequent trade flows, if any. Next, we estimate the relation between regulatory indices and the value of bilateral trade for total services and other business services. The hypothesis is that the regulatory indices, both intensity and heterogeneity, are negatively related to market entry. 17 This would support the assumption that regulation is associated by significant fixed costs. We also expect that regulatory indices may have a larger impact on business services than the average for services, since business services are presumably more complex and subject to more information asymmetries that justify regulation than average. There is, however, the possibility that regulation strongly affects firms' choice of mode of entry in export markets in cases where modes are substitutes. Regulation that firms regard as onerous could for instance deter them from establishing a commercial presence in the country but engage in cross-border trade instead. 18 Ideally, the study should apply firm-level data, but such data are not available, and an analysis of trade data at a sectoral level is the best that can be done.
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As argued in section 2, regulation can also reduce trade costs by setting common standards and reduce information asymmetries. The regulation indices presented above, however, mainly reflect regulation that restricts businesses activities.
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In order to explore this possibility bilateral data on FDI stocks and flows by services sector is needed,
but not yet available.
The regulatory barriers that come closest to representing the regulatory measures falling under GATS Article VI.4 are presented in Figure 4 which depicts a hierarchy where subordinate indicators are included in the main indicator above it:
Figure 2. Regulatory measures included in the regressions
LB ( regulation, and thus go beyond the scope of Article VI in the GATS. Nevertheless, this indicator is highly relevant to regional agreements and to the discussion of the impact of regulatory heterogeneity in general and on technical standards and qualification requirements in particular. We finally included legal barriers (LB), which relates to limitations on the number of competitors allowed in the sector. This is a market access issue, while procedures related to its implementation may be considered a domestic regulation issue.
A country's regulation is based on policy objectives and capacity to implement regulation.
Individual regulatory indices are therefore often highly correlated as they reflect the same underlying objectives and capacities. For this reason it may be difficult to isolate the impact of one specific regulatory indicator in empirical analysis. We therefore start by estimating the relation between trade and regulation with the most aggregate regulatory indicators that contain the detailed indicators discussed above. These estimates capture the relation between regulation in general and services trade, but does not provide much specific information on the proposed disciplines on domestic regulation under GATS Article VI.4. The detailed indicators are therefore entered into the regressions, one at a time, and the results indicate which indicator is likely to have an effect on services trade and the relative importance of the indicators.
Determinants of market entry
This section explores the relation between regulation and the probability to enter export market. The variable of interest is thus whether or not a pair of countries in the data sample trade in the service in question. If the data entry in the OECD bilateral trade statistics is zero, it is assumed that there is no trade, if the data entry is "-" or two dots, the data is considered as non-available and not included in the regression. Since we only have data for the OECD countries on domestic regulation, the analysis in this section is limited to the OECD countries.
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The results are presented in Table 2 for total services as well as for other business services. It reports the sign and statistical significance of each of the regulatory indices included, while the details, 20
The "Both EU", common language and contiguous dummies predicted entry perfectly and were dropped by the regression program. Note: *** and ** denote statistical significance at a 1% and 5% level respectively. Shading indicates the largest coefficient in case of substantial differences between reporter and partner country.
The results by and large support our hypothesis that regulatory indices constitute an entry cost for foreign providers: Aggregate regulatory indices are negatively correlated with service imports, suggesting that regulation can prevent foreign firms from entering the market; Regulation also appears to impede local firms from entering foreign markets, suggesting that domestic regulation at home can be a drag on local firms' international competitiveness; Regulatory heterogeneity appears to impede market entry; The heterogeneity index with the largest impact on entry is, not surprisingly "barriers to trade and investment", followed by the heterogeneity variable for overall product market regulation.
The regressions also produced some unexpected results. For instance administrative opacity is positively correlated with market entry. A possible explanation can be that firms are hesitant to invest in markets where the license system is non-transparent and cumbersome and where they face discriminatory procedures. They would therefore choose to service such countries through exports rather than investment.
Another possible explanation could be that licence procedures even when non-transparent or discriminatory are correlated with more certainty and less risk for expensive litigation. More research is needed to investigate the robustness and reasons for this finding, but as seen below restrictive licensing procedures are also significantly and positively correlated with services export values.
Other business services
The regression results support our hypothesis that regulation can constitute a barrier to entry in other business services including professional services, but the results are somewhat mixed: Regulatory indices both in the exporting and importing country are significantly correlated with trade, but the relation is strongest in the exporting country. Thus, strict regulation at home appears to impose a drag on local firms' ability to engage in exports; Regulatory heterogeneity is not significantly correlated with market entry.
While the exporting country's GDP had a larger effect on the probability to export for total services, it is the importing country's market size that matters more for bilateral market entry in business services. In sum, smaller countries with few regulatory restrictions on their services providers tend to export business services to larger trading partners.
Determinants of trade flows
This section explores the relation between the regulatory indices presented in Figure 4 and trade values. A time dummy was also introduced in order to assess to what extent omitted variables that follow a time trend had an impact on services trade. Technological development is a case in point and one would for instance expect that developments in information and communication technology could have an impact on cross-border trade in services. We therefore introduced a time dummy which is 0 for 1999 and 1 for 2003, the two years for which data on regulation is available. The results are presented in Tables 3 and 4 .
Total services trade
We first note that the determinants of market entry and subsequent trade flows are largely the same. Starting with the heterogeneity indices, the following are statically significant and negatively related to trade: PMR, BE and BT (which is also their ranking according to parameter value). As discussed above it can be difficult to distinguish the impact of indicators at a disaggregate level. This is reflected in the results where the aggregate indicators are the most statistically and economically significant. As we move down the hierarchy of indices, the relation to trade becomes less apparent. We notice that importer regulation has larger coefficients than exporter regulation for most indicators. Perhaps surprisingly the time dummy turned out to be negative and statistically significant. Total predicted bilateral services exports foreign persons by foreign affiliates of U.S. companies and these data show that there has indeed been a trend decline in cross-border exports relative to affiliate sales.
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We finally analysed what could happen if regulation was harmonised or mutual recognition was introduced. 23 Harmonisation could mean that countries converge towards a benchmark, for instance by adopting international standards where such standards exist. Another possibility is that countries move towards recognising each others standards and qualifications. We used the aggregate product market regulation index (PMR) for this exercise and constructed three scenarios. In the first the countries with the most divergent regulation reduce the regulatory heterogeneity between them to the average for all OECD 21
The big 6 non-OECD exporters are Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. The methodology is the following: the parameters on the heterogeneity indices are first estimated by means of reporter and partner country fixed effect gravity regressions. This ensures that all unobserved country-specific variables, including the level of regulation are captured. The bilateral control variables included was common language, common border, both EU, and relative distance. harmonised regulation such that their index came down to the average, while those below average were unchanged. In this scenario, total services exports among the OECD countries increase by 2.5%. In the second scenario, we impose full harmonisation for the country pairs that have the most similar regulation initially. The heterogeneity index is set to zero for the countries that have an index below the mean (0.37) while there are no changes for the other country pairs. This increases total OECD exports by about 30%. This estimate should be taken as a rough indicator because the scenario did not explicitly model how the harmonisation came about, and it is implicitly assumed that the coefficients on the country dummies stay the same. Given the multitude of country characteristics that are captured in the country dummy, it is probably not unreasonable to assume that the impact of the required change in regulatory levels in order to harmonise with trading partners (over and above the effect of harmonisation itself) would be small.
Business services
Business services are much more sensitive to regulatory restrictions as indicated by Figure 6 , which shows the elasticity of exports with respect to regulatory indices. Here the aggregate product market regulatory index has an elasticity larger than unity.
The relation between regulation and inward and outward FDI flows is explored by regressing FDI flows on the relevant regulatory indices, controlling for market size, remoteness, regional trade dummies and a time trend. In the absence of bilateral FDI data, we analysed aggregate FDI flows for the 27 OECD countries included in our database. 24 We included the same regulatory indices as in the analysis of crossborder trade (see Figure 4) . The results are presented in Table 5 , which only reports the coefficients (elasticities) -all significant at a 1% level. Most of the regulatory barriers that are statistically significant are negatively related to both inward and outward FDI, and the effect is larger for outward investment.
Regulation thus appears to be more effective in restraining local investors from going abroad than in restricting foreign entry. However legal barriers are positively related to FDI outward flows.
SUMMARY, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has argued that regulatory measures affect the fixed costs of entering a market as well as the variable costs of servicing that market. The study has explained that market entry barriers limit the number of firms that can break even in a particular market. The higher the entry barrier relative to the size of the market, the smaller the number of firms that can break even after having incurred the entry cost. In the face of such entry costs, trade liberalisation, defined as a reduction in variable trade costs, would under realistic assumptions lead to an increase in trade and a global market concentration as the average firm size becomes larger. Competition need not be affected, however, since the total number of firms, local plus foreign, will in most cases increase. 25 Nevertheless, trade liberalisation in the face of significant entry barriers would have a negative effect on small and medium size enterprises' (SMEs) ability to enter foreign markets. If this is an unwanted side-effect of liberalisation, it can be mitigated by regulatory reforms aiming at reducing entry barriers.
Regulation of services sectors aims at correcting market failures such as asymmetric information, moral hazard, and market power due to economies of scale, to mention the most important. When such regulation successfully remedies market failure, they can potentially lower entry barriers and improve welfare. Furthermore, when regulation is harmonised between trading partners, it facilitates the integration of services markets. However, complying with regulation is usually not costless and governments do not 24 We also did the regressions for FDI flows in business services. There are, however, a number of gaps in the data for this sector and the results were not entirely convincing.
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Competition could however suffer in small countries if the entry barrier is large relative to the market.
have perfect information such that regulation will seldom eliminate market failure. The empirical part of this study has made an attempt to measure what the costs and benefits of regulations are in the context of international trade in services.
The regulatory measures mentioned in GATS Article VI.4: qualification requirements and qualification procedures, licensing requirements and licensing procedures, and technical standards are mainly related to upfront costs of entering a market. The empirical section of the paper focused on indicators that reflect the restrictiveness of regulation in these areas and assessed their impact on foreign market entry for services at an aggregate level as well as for other business services and financial services.
It was found that aggregate measures of product market regulation as measured by the OECD regulatory indices is negatively related to both market entry and subsequent trade values. The effect is larger for other business services than for services on average, probably reflecting that other business services are more information-intensive and less standardised than services on average and therefore are more sensitive to regulation. However, looking at the specific regulatory measures, the empirical results are less clear-cut, but they do support the prediction that regulation in this area first and foremost constitutes a fixed trade costs. Finally, it is argued that foreign direct investment could be more sensitive to regulatory barriers than cross-border trade, since FDI involves a larger commitment of a firm's resources in the host country and thus a higher risk.
The data on regulation of the financial sector allowed a more comprehensive empirical analysis.
A very interesting finding is that regulation aiming at ensuring appropriate standards reduces both fixed and variable costs of servicing foreign markets in financial services for cross-border trade and FDI.
Regulation that seeks to restrict the types of services banks can engage in, in contrast, has a negative impact on financial services sector trade. Both for other business services and financial services we find that regulation in the exporting country has the largest impact on trade flows.
From these findings the following policy lessons can be drawn:
• Well-designed domestic regulation in services characterised by imperfect competition, can reduce trade cost. Such regulation would be more beneficial when it is subject to international harmonisation or international standards where applicable.
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• Well-regulated domestic markets can enhance the competitiveness of local service suppliers in foreign markets.
• In contrast, excessive domestic regulation not only restricts foreign suppliers from entering the market, it can be even more effective in restricting domestic suppliers from entering foreign markets.
• Excessive and heterogeneous regulation discourages small and medium size enterprises from entering foreign markets to a larger extent than large multinational companies and may unintentionally contribute to market concentration.
• Small countries are more affected by own and trading partner regulation than larger countries. Harmonising regulation with large trading partners could reduce trade costs for domestic firms in small countries. Costs of reforms in that regard need to be taken into account, however.
• Declining variable costs to trade in services due to trade liberalisation and improvements in communication technology contributes to rising average firm size. Regulatory reforms would help lower entry barriers and contribute to a conducive environment for SMEs.
What are the implications of these lessons for the GATS and other international trade agreements?
Trade liberalisation in services and regulatory reforms should go hand in hand. It has been shown in this study that trade liberalisation alone could lead to international market concentration, while lowering entry 26 GATS Article VI.5(b) states that international standards shall be taken into account when determining whether a member is in conformity with the obligations on regulation in sectors in which the country has taken specific commitments. It is in other words not required to adopt international standards.
barriers through regulatory reform could mitigate this effect. GATS commitments and disciplines on domestic regulation should be seen as complementary. In regional agreements aiming for deeper integration of services markets, harmonisation or mutual recognition of licence requirements, standards and qualification requirements would substantially enhance market integration.
Regulatory measures such as for instance qualification requirements have aspects of market access (Article XVI), national treatment (Article XVII) and domestic regulation (Article VI) in the GATS.
Whereas restrictions on market access and national treatment are scheduled in the specific commitments, obligations to minimise the trade-restrictive impact of domestic regulation are not. Thus, since market access and national treatment on the one hand and domestic regulation on the other are treated differently in the GATS, certainty about what falls under which Article is important. According to a recent paper by the WTO Secretariat, uncertainties in this area have in the past had the effect that countries have been reluctant to make commitments in the GATS out of fear of losing regulatory discretion (Adlung, 2006) . If so, the issue needs to be clarified.
Our empirical results suggest that an unfavourable score on the indicator "communication and simplification of rules and procedures" is negatively related to exports, imports and FDI of total services and for outward FDI in other business services. Therefore, enforceable horizontal rules on transparency are likely to help stimulate trade and FDI in services, although large effects should not be expected from rules on transparency alone.
Mutual recognition or harmonisation of regulation would reduce trade costs significantly.
However, our results to this effect, which are strong and robust, are drawn from an analysis of OECD countries only, and it is not obvious that the result would carry over to the entire WTO membership. The nature of market failure that needs to be addressed through regulatory measures depends on the nature, development and complexity of the markets in question, while the capacity to regulate increases with the level of development. 27 Therefore mandating harmonisation of regulation under GATS Article VI.4 would probably be ill advised. Instead mutual recognition and harmonisation of standards could be encouraged.
27
There is for instance a strong correlation between the regulatory quality index used in the regressions in Section 4 and GDP per capita. Notes: The standard errors are presented in parentheses. Values marked (***) and (**) are significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The regressions include the following regulatory indicies: Reg1: PMR, Reg2: BE, Reg3: BT, Reg4: EBT, Reg5: RAO, Reg6: ABS(1) and BC(2), Reg7: TOB, Reg8: LPS(1), LB(2) and RB(3), Reg9:
CRSP(1) and ABC(2), Reg10: SSAB. Values marked (***) and (**) are significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The regressions include the following regulatory indicies: Reg1: PMR, Reg2: BE, Reg3: BT, Reg4: EBT, Reg5 ABS(1) and BC(2), Reg6: TOB, Reg7: LPS(1), LB(2) and RB(3), Reg8: CRSP(1) and ABC(2), Reg9: SSAB.
T Table A2. Note: The robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively.
The regressions include the following regulatory indices: Reg1: PMR, Reg2: BE, Reg3:BT, Reg4: EBT, Reg5:RAO, Reg6:
ABS + BC, Reg7:TOB, Reg8:CSRP+ABS, Reg9: Regulatory quality (from governance indicators)+SSAB.
